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Abstract. Starting with the neo-Bayesian revival of the 1950s, many
statisticians argued that it was inappropriate to use Bayesian meth-
ods, and in particular subjective Bayesian methods in governmental
and public policy settings because of their reliance upon prior distri-
butions. But the Bayesian framework often provides the primary way
to respond to questions raised in these settings and the numbers and
diversity of Bayesian applications have grown dramatically in recent
years. Through a series of examples, both historical and recent, we ar-
gue that Bayesian approaches with formal and informal assessments of
priors AND likelihood functions are well accepted and should become
the norm in public settings. Our examples include census-taking and
small area estimation, US election night forecasting, studies reported to
the US Food and Drug Administration, assessing global climate change,
and measuring potential declines in disability among the elderly.
Key words and phrases: Census adjustment, confidentiality, disability
measurement, election night forecasting, Bayesian clinical drug studies,
global warming, small area estimation.
1. INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY
Beginning with the posthumous publication in 1763
of the essay attributed to the Rev. Thomas Bayes,
and continuing well into the twentieth century, vir-
tually the only approach to statistical inference was
the method of inverse probability based on applica-
tions of Bayes’s theorem (see, e.g., Fienberg, 2006a).
Nonetheless, most applications of statistical meth-
Stephen E. Fienberg is Maurice Falk University
Professor, Department of Statistics, Heinz College,
Machine Learning Department, and Cylab, Carnegie
Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
15213-3890, USA e-mail: fienberg@stat.cmu.edu; URL:
http://www.stat.cmu.edu/fienberg/.
1Discussed in 10.1214/11-STS331A, 10.1214/11-STS331B
and 10.1214/11-STS331C; rejoinder at
10.1214/11-STS331REJ.
This is an electronic reprint of the original article
published by the Institute of Mathematical Statistics in
Statistical Science, 2011, Vol. 26, No. 2, 212–226. This
reprint differs from the original in pagination and
typographic detail.
ods in governmental settings were based primarily
on descriptive statistics and there was little debate
regarding the relevance of Bayesian approaches in
public life despite efforts at implementation, for ex-
ample, Laplace’s development of ratio estimation to
estimate the size of the population of France.
Criticism of the method of inverse probability, as
Bayesian methodology was known for almost
200 years, began in the mid-19th century with the
rise of a philosophical school advocating objective
probability. The fundamental concern of the objec-
tivists was the requirement for a prior distribution
and they argued for a frequentist view of probabil-
ity. Unfortunately they failed to present a method-
ology for inference to counter that of inverse proba-
bility and it was not until the work of R. A. Fisher
and Jerzy Neyman and Egon Pearson in the 1920s
that serious alternative statistical procedures were
in place. Neyman’s (1934) critique of Gini’s version
of the representative method for survey taking not
only ushered the frequentist repeated sampling per-
spective into the realm of official statistics, but it
also introduced the frequentist tool of confidence in-
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tervals and its long-run repeated sampling interpre-
tation (see Fienberg and Tanur, 1996).
Bayesian tools played an important role in a num-
ber of statistical efforts duringWorld War II, includ-
ing Alan Turing’s work at Bletchley Park, England,
to crack the Enigma code, but with the creation
of such frequentist methods as sequential analysis
by Barnard in England and Wald in the United
States and the elaboration of design-based analy-
ses in sample surveys, as statistics passed the mid-
century mark, frequentist approaches were in the
ascendancy in the public arena. This was especially
true in statistical agencies where the ideas of ran-
dom selection of samples and repeated sampling as
the basis of inference were synonymous, and statis-
tical models and likelihood-based methods frowned
upon at best.
With the introduction of computers for statistical
calculations in the 1960s, however, Bayesian meth-
ods began a slow but prolonged comeback that ac-
celerated substantially with the introduction of Mar-
kov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods in the
early 1990s. Today Bayesian methods are challeng-
ing the supremacy of the frequentist approaches in
a wide array of areas of application.
How do the approaches differ? In frequentist infe-
rence, tests of significance are performed by suppo-
sing that a hypothesis is true (the null hypothesis)
and then computing the probability of observing
a statistic at least as extreme as the one actually ob-
served during hypothetical future repeated trials con-
ditional on the parameters, that is, a p-value. Baye-
sian inference relies upon direct inferences about pa-
rameters or predictions conditional on the observa-
tions. In other words, frequentist statistics examines
the probability of the data given a model (hypoth-
esis) and looks at repeated sampling properties of
a procedure, whereas Bayesian statistics examines
the probability of a model given the observed data.
Bayesian methodology relies largely upon Bayes’s
theorem for computing posterior probabilities and
provides an internally consistent and coherent nor-
mative methodology; frequentist methodology has
no such consistent normative framework. Freedman
(1995) gave an overview of these philosophical posi-
tions, but largely from a frequentist perspective that
is critical of the Bayesian normative approach.
The remainder of the article has the following
structure. In the next section I give a summary of
some of the most common and cogent criticisms of
the Bayesian method, especially with regard to its
use in a public context. Then in Section 3, through
a series of examples, both historical and recent, I ar-
gue that Bayesian approaches with formal and infor-
mal assessments of priors and likelihood functions
are well accepted and should become the norm in
public settings. My examples include US election
night forecasting, census-taking and small area es-
timation, studies reported to the US Food and Drug
Administration, assessing global climate change, and
measuring declines in disability among the elderly.
We conclude with a brief summary of challenges fac-
ing broader implementation of Bayesian methods in
public contexts.
I do not claim to be providing a comprehensive ac-
count of Bayesian applications but have merely at-
tempted to illustrate their breadth. One area where
Bayesian ideas have made serious inroads, both in
theory and in actual practice, but which we do not
discuss here is the law (e.g., see Fienberg and Kada-
ne, 1983; Donnelly, 2005; Taroni et al., 2006; Kadane,
2008). The present article includes a purposeful se-
lection of references to guide the reader to some of
the relevant recent Bayesian literature on applica-
tions in the domains mentioned, but the list is far
from comprehensive and tends to emphasize work
closest to my own.
2. THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST
THE USE OF BAYESIAN METHODS
Bayesian and frequentist inference in a nutshell:
It is especially convenient for the present purposes
to think about Bayes’s theorem in terms of density
functions. Let h(y|θ) denote the conditional density
of the random variable Y given a parameter value θ
in the parameter space Θ. Then we can go from
the prior distribution for θ, g(θ), to that associated
with θ given Y = y, g(θ|y), by
g(θ|y) = h(y|θ)g(θ)/
∑
θ∈Θ
h(y|θ)g(θ)(1)
if θ has a discrete distribution,
g(θ|y) = h(y|θ)g(θ)/
∫
Θ
h(y|θ)g(θ)dθ(2)
if θ has a continuous distribution.
Bayesians make inferences about the parameters by
looking directly at the posterior distribution g(θ|y)
given the data y. Frequentists make inferences
about θ indirectly by considering the repeated sam-
pling properties of the distribution of the data y
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given the parameter θ, that is, through h(y|θ). Baye-
sians integrate out quantities not of direct substan-
tive interest and then are able to make probabilis-
tic inferences from marginal distributions. Most fre-
quentists use some form of conditioning argument
for inference purposes while others maximize like-
lihood functions. Frequentists distinguish between
random variables and parameters which they take to
be fixed and this leads to linear mixed models where
some of the effects are fixed, that is, are parameters,
and some are random variables. For a Bayesian all
linear models are in essence random effects models
since parameters are themselves considered as ran-
dom variables. Thus it is natural for a Bayesian to
consider them to be independent draws from a com-
mon distribution, g(θ), that is, treating them as ex-
changeable following the original argument of de Fi-
netti (1937). This approach leads naturally to put-
ting distributions on the parameters of prior distri-
butions and to what we now call the hierarchical
Bayesian model. It is the normalizing constants [the
denominators of (1) and (2)] that are notoriously
difficult to compute and this fact has led, in large
part, to the use of MCMC methods such as Gibbs
sampling that involve sampling from the posterior
distribution.
A reviewer of an earlier version of this article sug-
gested that hierarchical models are really not Baye-
sian, unless one puts a prior at the top level of the hi-
erarchy. This ignores history. As Good (1965) noted,
his own use of such ideas draws on work dating back
at least to the 1920s and the work of W. E. John-
son whose “sufficientness” postulate implicitly used
finite exchangeable sequences. And while non-Baye-
sians came to recognize the power of such structures
many decades later they did attempt to emulate the
Bayesian approach, but of course without the clean
Bayesian probabilistic interpretation.
Critique of the Bayesian perspective: The most
common criticism of Bayesian methods is that, since
there is no single correct prior distribution, g(θ), all
conclusions drawn from the posterior distribution
are suspect. One counter to this argument is that
published analyses using Bayesian methods should
consider and report the results associated with a va-
riety of prior distributions, thus allowing the reader
to see the effects of different prior beliefs on the
posterior distribution of a parameter. Others argue
that one should choose as a prior distribution one
that in some sense eliminates personal subjectiv-
ity. Examples of such “objective” priors are those
that are uniform or diffuse across all possible values
of the parameter, or those that are “information-
less.” Berger (2006) and Goldstein (2006) presented
arguments in favor of the objective and subjective
Bayesian approaches in a forum followed by exten-
sive discussion. For a discussion of the fruitlessness
of the search for an objective and informationless
prior, see the article by Fienberg (2006b).
There are a number of other features associated
with the subjective approach including the elicita-
tion of information for the formulation of prior dis-
tributions and the use of exchangeability in the de-
velopment of successive layers of hierarchical mod-
els. A number of the examples described in the sec-
tions that follow utilize subjective Bayesian features
although not always with full elicitation.
One characteristic of Bayesian inference that weak-
ens this criticism of the reliance on the prior dis-
tribution is that the more data we collect, the less
influence the prior distribution has on the posterior
distribution relative to that of the data. There are
situations, however, where even an infinite amount
of data may not bring two people into agreement
(see, e.g., Diaconis and Freedman, 1986).
Another aspect of the Bayesian methodology that
arises in many applications is the manner in which
it “borrows strength” when we are estimating many
parameters simultaneously, especially through the
use of hierarchical models. This feature, which is
usually viewed as a virtue, has also been the focal
point of criticism by frequentists. For example, see
the commentary by Freedman and Navidi (1986) in
the context of census adjustment, in which they cri-
tiqued a Bayesian methodology at least in part be-
cause it resulted in the use of data from one state to
adjust the census-based population figures in other
ones. Today, borrowing strength via cross-area re-
gression models is common in frequentist circles, and
the Freedman–Navidi argument thus takes on a non-
statistical legal issue rather than a statistical one.
For an interesting dialog on different frequentist
perspectives related to statistical inference, see the
discussion paper by a group of frequentist statisti-
cians at Groningen University in The Netherlands,
Kardaun et al. (2003), which was a response to a se-
ries of questions posed by David Cox following a lec-
ture at Groningen. As someone else has noted, it is
a rare occasion where frequentists seriously enter-
tain ideas such as those extolled by de Finetti (1937)
and attempt to reject them. A number of the ques-
tions discussed in this article arise in the context of
the examples that follow.
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3. SMALL AREA ESTIMATION AND CENSUS
ADJUSTMENT
Small area estimation: As we have already inti-
mated, small area estimation has been a ripe area for
Bayesian methods although because so much of the
literature has been oriented toward national statis-
tical agency problems, the area is dominated by fre-
quentist techniques and assessments. Surveys con-
ducted by national statistical agencies typically gen-
erate “reliable” information either at national or re-
gional levels. But the demand for information at
lower levels of disaggregation is sufficiently great and
resources tend to be relatively scarce, so that tech-
niques that bolster the sparsity of data at the lower
level of disaggregation with data from other sources
or from other areas or domains are essential to get-
ting estimates with relatively small standard errors.
The big question is with respect to what distri-
bution are the standard errors computed. There are
three different answers depending on one’s perspec-
tive. Sampling statisticians most often wish to take
expectations with respect to the random structure
in the sampling design. At the other extreme are
Bayesians for whom the variability is an inherent
part of the stochastic model structure for the phe-
nomenon of interest, for example, unemployment or
crime. And in the middle are model-based likelihood
statisticians. My argument is that in the context
of small area estimation the design-based statisti-
cians were singularly unsuccessful until they emu-
lated Bayesian ideas of smoothing and borrowing
strength, but even then they have insisted on av-
eraging with respect to the sampling design, with
arguments about robustness of results.
Jiang and Lahiri (2006) suggested that the prob-
lem goes back almost a millennium to the eleventh
century, but interest in formal statistical estimation
for small areas is a relatively recent phenomenon
and much of the recent literature can be traced to
a seminal article by Fay and Herriot (1979) who
used the James–Stein “shrinkage” estimation ideas
to carry out small area estimation in a frequen-
tist manner. Given the close relationship between
such techniques and empirical Bayesian estimation
(e.g., see Efron and Morris, 1973) and mixed linear
models, it is a relatively small leap to the use of
fully Bayesian methodology. But the evolution to-
ward such methodology documented by Jiang and
Lahiri has been relatively slow and marked by a gen-
eral resistance in statistical agencies to use models
to begin with, let alone Bayesian formulations; for
example, see the descriptions of small area estima-
tion methodology in the book by Rao (2003), and
contrast it with the Bayesian hierarchical formula-
tions in the work of Ballin, Scanu and Vicard (2005)
and Trevisani and Torelli (2004).
Census adjustment: What is remarkable about the
ascendency of the small area estimation methodol-
ogy in the United States is that many of those who
argued for its use opposed the use of essentially the
same ideas for census adjustment for differential un-
dercount in the 1980s and 1990s. The basic compo-
nent of census adjustment in these debates was the
use of the now standard capture-recapture method-
ology for population estimation (e.g., see Bishop,
Fienberg and Holland, 1975, Chapter 6), methodol-
ogy that has its roots in Laplace’s method of ratio
estimation. Because a second count (the recapture)
in a census context cannot reasonably be done for
the nation as a whole, methods that utilize a sam-
ple of individuals were introduced in 1950 and to get
small area estimates of population, that is, for ev-
ery block in the nation, Ericksen and Kadane (1985)
proposed the use of a Bayesian regression model for
smoothing. Being fully Bayesian was especially im-
portant because of the sparseness of the data at their
disposal for adjustment, based on a sample from
the Current Population Survey. As we noted above,
Freedman and Navidi (1986) opposed the use of this
methodology as did Fay and Herriot’s colleagues at
the US Census Bureau, at least in part on its use of
models with unverifiable assumptions, and precisely
because the shrinkage approach embedded in the
methodology borrowed strength across state bound-
aries to get sufficiently tight estimates of error.
Ericksen, Kadane and Tukey (1989) presented
a more refined version of the technical arguments
looking back to the 1980 census, as well as ahead to
the 1990 census. For the 1990 census, the US Census
Bureau essentially proposed the use of a frequen-
tist approach that had similar structure, at least in
spirit, to that proposed for 1980, and this was pos-
sible only by increasing the size of the sample used
for adjustment purposes by an order of magnitude.
This plan was opposed largely on political grounds
as well as by Freedman and colleagues who contin-
ued to object to the role of statistical models in
the estimation procedure. A similar controversy en-
sued as planning for the 2000 census progressed with
components for adjustment as well as sampling for
nonresponse followup, and ultimately the Supreme
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Court stepped in and interpreted the Census Act as
banning the use of sampling for this purpose. Ander-
son and Fienberg (1999) and Anderson et al. (2000)
provided extensive details on the 1990 and 2000 ad-
justment controversies. While American politicians
have eschewed the use of Bayesian and non-Bayesian
adjustment techniques, statistical agencies in sev-
eral other countries, such as Argentina, Australia
and the United Kingdom, have implemented similar
methodology, although with little emphasis on its
Bayesian motivation.
4. ELECTION NIGHT FORECASTING
In the United States the use of statistical forecast-
ing of election outcomes based on early reported re-
turns began in the early 1950s. The CBS television
network employed one of the early computers, the
UNIVAC, and the statistician MaxWoodbury devel-
oped a regression-style model that was used success-
fully to predict the outcome of the 1952 presiden-
tial election. By 1960, computers had become a ma-
jor tool of the US television networks in support of
their election night coverage. Everything was based
in some form or another on the 150,000+ precincts
where votes were cast across the US, and attention
focused on subsets of “key” precincts, chosen in dif-
ferent ways by the three major networks, and on
early access to precinct results. The following de-
scription draws upon that in the article by Fienberg
(2007).
In 1960, the RCA Corporation which owned the
NBC television network, hired CEIR, a statistical
consulting firm, to develop a rapid election night pro-
jection procedure. CEIR consultants included Max
Woodbury, and a number of others including John
Tukey. Computers were still large, expensive and
slow, and much of what MaxWoodbury had done for
CBS still had to be done by hand. Data of several
types were available: past history (at various lev-
els, e.g., county), results of polls preceding the elec-
tion, political scientists’ predictions, partial county
returns flowing in during the evening, and complete
results for selected precincts. The data of the anal-
yses were, in many cases, swings from sets of base
values derived from past results and from political
scientists’ opinions. It turned out that the impor-
tant problem of projecting turnout was more dif-
ficult than that of projecting candidate percentage.
Starting with the 1962 congressional election, Tukey
assembled a statistical team to develop the required
methodology and to analyze the results as they flo-
wed in on election night. Early members of the team
included Bob Abelson, David Brillinger, Dick Link,
John Mauchly and David Wallace who joined for
the 1964 primaries. From 1962 through 1966, they
were consultants to RCA and they interacted with
the political scientists and one-time Census Bureau
official Richard Scammon who had his own method-
ology using a collection of key precinct results.
David Brillinger (2002) recalled: “Tukey sought
‘improved’ estimates. His terminology was that the
problem was one of ‘borrowing strength’.” There is
a remarkably close resemblance between this metho-
dology and that used for small area estimation. The
novel feature in the election night context comes
from the nature of the sparsity—because estimation
was based on early reported returns. The method-
ology is now recognizable as hierarchical Bayesian
with the use of empirical Bayesian techniques at the
top level. Data flowed in with observations at the
precinct (polling place) level and were aggregated
to county level, and then to the state as a whole.
Subjective judgment was used in the choice of the
subsets of “key” precincts and prior distributions
were typically based on the results of prior state
elections with the choice being made subjectively to
capture the political scientists’ best judgment about
which past election most closely resembled the elec-
tion at hand. As early returns arrived at the com-
puting central command facility, a team of statis-
ticians reviewed the actual distribution of early re-
turns across the state to check for anomalies in light
of special circumstances and political practices.
And estimates that really mattered were those at
the state level since the model was used for statewide
elections for governor and senate positions as well as
for presidential elections where state outcomes play
a crucial role. Two models were used: one for pro-
jecting turnout and the other for projecting the ac-
tual percentage difference (“swing”) between Demo-
cratic and Republican candidates. The occasional
rise of serious independent candidates led to model
extensions and empirical complications.
Brillinger went on to note: “Jargon was developed;
for example, there were ‘barometric’ and ‘swing-o-
metric’ precinct samples. The procedures developed
can be described as an early example of empiri-
cal Bayes. The uncertainties, developed on a differ-
ent basis, were just as important as the point esti-
mates.” The variance calculations appeared nowhere
in the statistical literature and thus they had to
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be derived and verified by members of the team.
This was at about the same time as David Wal-
lace was working with Frederick Mosteller on their
landmark Bayesian study of The Federalist Papers,
which was published in 1964. Tukey’s attitude to
release of the techniques developed is worth com-
menting on. Brillinger recounted how, on various oc-
casions, members of his “team” were asked to give
talks and write papers describing the work. When
Tukey’s permission was sought, his remark was in-
variably that it was “too soon” and that the tech-
niques were “proprietary” to RCA and NBC. With
Tukey’s death in 2002, we may well have lost the
opportunity to learn all of the technical details of
the work done 40 years earlier.
Tukey’s students and his collaborators began to
use related ideas on “borrowing strength,” for exam-
ple, in the National Halothane Study of anesthetics
(Bunker et al., 1969) and for the analysis of contin-
gency table data (e.g., see Bishop, Fienberg and Hol-
land, 1975). All of this before the methodology was
described in somewhat different form by I. J. Good
in his 1965 book and christened as “hierarchical
Bayes” in the classic 1972 paper by Dennis Lind-
ley and Adrian Smith. The specific version of hier-
archical Bayes in the election night model remained
unpublished, although in an ironic twist, something
close to it appeared in a paper written by one of
David Wallace’s former students, Alastair Scott, and
a colleague, Fred Smith (1969, 1971), who were un-
aware of any of the details of Wallace’s work for
NBC and who developed their approach for different
purposes! Several other hierarchical Bayesian elec-
tion night forecasting models have now been used in
other countries, for example, see the work of Brown,
Firth and Payne (1997) and Bernardo and Giro´n
(1992).
The methods described here were in use at NBC
through the 1980 presidential elections. Other net-
works used different methodology and the statisti-
cians who worked for the Tukey team were quite
proud of their record of early and more accurate calls
of winners than those made by the other networks,
especially in close elections. With Reagan’s land-
slide presidential victory in 1980, the results were
seemingly better captured by exit polls and from
1982 onward NBC switched to the use of exit polls
in competition and then in collaboration with the
other television networks. See the article by Fien-
berg (2007) for further details and a number of the
recent controversies regarding exit poll forecasting
and reporting.
5. BAYESIAN METHODOLOGY AND THE US
FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION
Traditional randomized clinical trials, evaluated
with frequentist methodology, have long been viewed
as the bedrock of the drug and device approval sys-
tem at the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
Over the past couple of decades the drug companies
and some members of the US Congress have been
critical of the lengthy FDA review processes that
have resulted and the enormous expense associated
with bringing drugs and medical devices to market.
The statistical literature has also produced Bayesian
randomized design alternatives (e.g., see Spiegelhal-
ter, Freedman and Parmar 1994; Berry, 1991, 1993,
1997; Berry and Stangl, 1996; Simon, 1999), as well
as ethical critiques of traditional frequentist trials
(e.g., see Kadane, 1996). Aside from the actual in-
terpretation of the outcomes in a Bayesian frame-
work, these and other authors have argued that the
Bayesian approach can provide faster and more use-
ful clinical trial information in a wide variety of cir-
cumstances in comparison with frequentist method-
ology.
Bayesian designs and analyses are part of an in-
creasing number of premarket submissions to FDA’s
Center for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH).
This initiative, which began in the late 1990s, takes
advantage of good prior information on safety and
effectiveness that is often available for studies of the
same or similar recent generation devices. In 2006,
CDRH issued draft guidelines for the use of Bayesian
statistics in clinical trials for medical devices (FDA,
2006) and these were finalized in 2010 (FDA, 2010).
Previous regulatory guidelines have mentioned Baye-
sian methods briefly, but this was the first broadly
circulated specific document focusing on Bayesian
methodologies. The guidelines do, however, place
considerable onus on the drug companies who wish
to present Bayesian studies, largely because of justi-
fiable concerns over selective use of data from within
studies and the reporting of results.
As the guidelines make clear, Bayesian formula-
tions and methods can improve the assessment of
new drugs and devices by incorporating expert opin-
ion, results of prior investigations, both experiments
and observational studies, and synthesizing results
across concurrent studies. There are sections that
emphasize the importance of hierarchical models and
the different roles for exchangeability, for example,
among patients within trials and among trials. We
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quote from the final guidelines on the role of prior
information:
We recommend you identify as many sour-
ces of good prior information as possible.
The evaluation of “goodness” of the prior
information is subjective. Because your
trial will be conducted with the goal of
FDA approval of a medical device, you
should present and discuss your choice of
prior information with FDA reviewers (cli-
nical, engineering and statistical) before
your study begins.
Possible sources of prior information in-
clude:
• clinical trials conducted overseas,
• patient registries,
• clinical data on very similar products,
• pilot studies.
The guidelines go on:
Prior distributions based directly on data
from other studies are the easiest to eval-
uate. While we recognize that two stud-
ies are never exactly alike, we nonetheless
recommend the studies used to construct
the prior be similar to the current study
in the following aspects:
• protocol (endpoints, target population,
etc.), and
• time frame of the data collection (e.g.,
to ensure that the practice of medicine
and the study populations are compa-
rable).
In some circumstances, it may be helpful
if the studies are also similar in investiga-
tors and sites. Include studies that are fa-
vorable and nonfavorable. Including only
favorable studies creates bias. Bias, based
on study selection may be evaluated by:
• the representativeness of the studies that
are included, and
• the reasons for including or excluding
each study.
Prior distributions based on expert opin-
ion rather than data can be problematic.
Approval of a device could be delayed or
jeopardized if FDA advisory panel mem-
bers or other clinical evaluators do not
agree with the opinions used to generate
the prior (pages 22–23).
The FDA guidelines include examples of Bayesian
studies that have met agency review standards. Two
examples are:
Example 1 (T-Scan).2 T-scan 2000 is a de-
vice to be used as an adjunct to mammography for
patients with equivocal results. The FDA was pre-
sented with an “intended-use” study of 74 consec-
utive biopsies in Italy. The company combined the
results with those from a prospective double blind
study at seven centers compared T-scan to T-scan
plus mammography for 504 patients, and the results
from a “targeted” study of 657 biopsy cases at two
centers in Israel using a Bayesian multinomial logis-
tic model. It was able to demonstrate effectiveness
in intended use context where there was insufficient
information to demonstrate effectiveness. The prior
was chosen to smooth the zero counts but to be rel-
atively diffuse. The device was approved for this use
as a consequence in 1999.
Example 2 (Inter Fix).3 Inter Fix is an implant
device for spinal fusion procedure for patients with
degenerative disc disease and back pain. There were
data available for 139 patients in randomized clin-
ical trial, with 77 treated and 62 controls. There
were also 104 nonrandomized subjects treated. An
interim analysis was performed based on a Bayesian
predictive model for the future success rate of the
device, although most of the other analyses reported
appear to be frequentist in nature. The device was
approved in 1999 as well.
CDRH statisticians have been exploring and lec-
turing on important lessons learned in the course of
the Bayesian initiative for the design, conduct and
analysis of medical devices studies such as the two
outlined here.
Although the two studies described above made
use of the pooling of evidence, in many ways the key
benefit of Bayesian methods is the ability it offers to
change the study’s course when the welfare of sub-
jects is at stake—using what is known as adaptive
randomization. As Don Berry has argued:
2 http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfTopic/
pma/pma.cfm?num=p970033.
3 http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfTopic/
pma/pma.cfm?num=p970015.
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In a multiyear frequentist study, new pa-
tients will have the same chance of be-
ing enrolled in either group, regardless of
whether the new or old drug is perform-
ing better. This approach can put patients
at a disadvantage. A Bayesian model, on
the other hand, can periodically show re-
searchers that one arm is outperforming
the other and then put more new volun-
teers into the better arm. (Don Berry quo-
ted in Beckman, 2006)
As is the case in other applications, at the FDA
the main criticism of the Bayesian approach is the
difficulty associated with the choice of the prior.
Spiegelhalter, Freedman and Parmar (1994) stressed
the use of different forms of priors such as reference
priors, “clinical” priors, “skeptical” priors, and en-
thusiastic priors. The FDA guidelines clearly argue
against “subjective” expert opinion, but as we know
from other settings the likelihood function is often
at least as subjective as is the prior and hierarchical
Bayesian structures impose substantial constraints
on the prior and thus the posterior even when one
uses “diffuse” distributions on the parameters at the
highest levels of the hierarchy! Moreover, when one
is drawing upon previous studies, there is always an
issue of how much “weight” these should receive in
the prior, especially if the previous studies did not
involve randomization as in Example 2.
Unfortunately, as these ideas move to other parts
of the FDA they are not without controversy. While
we were completing this article, a new controversy
over a specific drug made news. Vasogen Inc. an-
nounced that on Friday, March 14, 2008 it had an
initial teleconference with the FDA to discuss and
clarify the recent FDA comments regarding the use
of a Bayesian approach for ACCLAIM II, a clinical
trial which is being planned to support an applica-
tion for US market approval of the CelacadeTM Sys-
tem for the treatment of patients with New York
Heart Association Class II heart failure.4 Oversight
of the drug approval had shifted from CDRH—which
had issued the guidelines for use of Bayesian me-
thods—to the FDA Center for Biologics Evaluation
and Research (CBER), which has adopted a far more
cautious approach. How such issues will work them-
selves out remains to be seen.
4FDA deals blow to Vasogen’s heart treatment, Reuters,
March 3, 2008.
Another place at the FDA where Bayesian method-
ology has recently come into vogue is in the post-
approval surveillance of drugs and devices, especially
with regard to side effects. DuMouchel (1999) dis-
cussed hierarchical Bayesian models for analyzing
a very large frequency table that cross-classifies ad-
verse events by type of drug used. Madigan et al.
(2010) described a more elaborate, large-scale ap-
proach to the analysis of adverse event data gath-
ered via spontaneous reporting systems linked to
claims databases.
It is worth noting that Bayesian methods have been
used in innovative ways to study the combination of
evidence across studies on matters directly before the
FDA. On the advice of an expert panel, the FDA in
2004 put a “black-box” warning—its highest warning
level—on antidepressants for pediatric use especially
among teenagers. The panel’s advice was based not
on actual suicides, but on indications that suicidal
thoughts and behaviors increased in some children
and teens taking newer selective serotonin reuptake
inhibitor (SSRI)-type antidepressants. Kaizar et al.
(2006) later addressed the combination of evidence
using a hierarchical Bayesian meta-analytical ap-
proach. They concluded that the evidence support-
ing a causal link between SSRI-type antidepressant
use and suicidality in children is weak. This will
clearly be evidence that the FDA will need to con-
sider when it next reviews this issue, as it surely will,
because of subsequent observational studies that sug-
gest teen suicides have increased considerably de-
spite a substantial decrease in the use of antidepres-
sants (e.g., see Gibbons et al., 2007).
Finally we note the extensive applications of a ran-
ge of Bayesian methods in the related matters of
health technology assessment as described by Spie-
gelhalter et al. (2000) and Spiegelhalter (2004).
6. CONFIDENTIALITY AND THE
RISK–UTILITY TRADE-OFF
Protecting the confidentiality of data provided by
individuals and establishments has been and contin-
ues to be a major preoccupation of statistical agen-
cies around the world. Over the past 30 years, statis-
ticians within and outside a number of major agen-
cies have worked to cast the confidentiality problem
as a statistical one, and over the past decade this ef-
fort has taken on substantial Bayesian overtones as
the focus has shifted to the trade-off between risk as-
sociated with protection of confidentiality and the
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utility of databases for different kinds of statisti-
cal analyses. See the articles in the book by Doyle,
Theeuwes and Zayatz (2001) for a broad review of
the literature as it stood about a decade ago.
Some of the earlier confidentiality literature fo-
cused on the protection of data against intruders
or “data snoopers” and Fienberg, Makov and Sanil
(1997) proposed modeling intruder behavior (and
thus protection against it) using a subjective Baye-
sian “matching” model; cf. the discussion of Bayesian
“matching” methods in the book by D’Orazio, Di
Zio and Scanu (2006). In 2001, Duncan et al. sug-
gested a Bayesian approach to the risk–utility trade-
off problem, which was later generalized in the con-
text of a formal statistical decision theory model
by Trottini and Fienberg (2002) and implemented
in illustrative form by Dobra, Fienberg and Trot-
tini (2003) in the context of protecting categorical
databases.
More recently, Ting, Fienberg and Trottini (2008)
contrasted their method of random orthogonal ma-
trix masking with other microdata perturbation me-
thods, such as additive noise, from the Bayesian per-
spective of the trade-off between disclosure risk and
data utility. This work has yet to be adopted by
statistical agencies, but related Bayesian modeling
in the same spirit by Franconi and Stander (2002),
Polettini and Stander (2004), Rinott and Shlomo
(2007) and Forster and Webb (2007) has been done
in close collaboration with those in agencies in Is-
rael, Italy and the United Kingdom.
One other Bayesian approach to confidentiality
protection which has already seen successful pen-
etration into US statistical agencies is based on the
method of multiple imputation approach due orig-
inally to Donald Rubin and proposed by him for
application in the context of protecting confiden-
tiality in 1993. See the article by Fienberg, Makov
and Steele (1998) for a related proposal. The ba-
sic idea is simple although the details of the imple-
mentation can be complex. We want to replace the
actual confidential data by simulated data drawn
from the posterior distribution of a model that cap-
tures the relationships among the variables to be
released. Since these “sampled units” are synthetic
and do not actually correspond to original sample
members, proponents claim that the resulting data
protect confidentiality by definition—others point
out that synthetic people may be close enough to
“real” sample members for there still to be problems
of possible re-identification. The method of multi-
ple imputation allows one to generate multiple syn-
thetic (imputed) samples from the posterior and to
use these samples to produce estimates of variabil-
ity that have a frequentist interpretation. Raghu-
nathan, Reiter and Rubin (2003) and authors of
a number of subsequent articles described the for-
malisms of the methodology as well as extensions
involving only partially imputed data. Because sta-
tistical agencies in the US were already experiment-
ing with multiple imputation to deal with missing
value problems, a number of them have recently ex-
perimented with this technology for confidentiality
protection as well. Since the methodology works for
fairly general classes of prior distributions it could
utilize, at least in principle, prior information from
multiple sources as well as expert judgment.
7. CLIMATE CHANGE AND ITS ABATEMENT
By now there is hardly a literate person who has
not heard about global warming and the dire con-
sequences predicted if we do not change our behav-
ior regarding the emission of greenhouse gases and
aerosols. The following statements are typical and
come from a report to the US Senate by Thomas
Karl (2001), a senior official in the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration:
• The natural “greenhouse” effect is real, and is an
essential component of the planet’s climate pro-
cess.
• Some greenhouse gases are increasing in the atmo-
sphere because of human activities and increas-
ingly trapping more heat.
• The increase in heat-trapping greenhouse gases
due to human activities are projected to be ampli-
fied by feedback effects, such as changes in water
vapor, snow cover, and sea ice.
• Particles (or aerosols) in the atmosphere resulting
from human activities can also affect climate.
• There is a growing set of observations that yields
a collective picture of a warming world over the
past century.
• It is likely that the frequency of heavy and ex-
treme precipitation events has increased as global
temperatures have risen.
• Scenarios of future human activities indicate conti-
nued changes in atmospheric composition through-
out the 21st century.
These and similar conclusions have been shared with
the public by the Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change (IPCC) and the US National Academy
of Sciences–National Research Council through a se-
10 S. E. FIENBERG
ries of committee reports. Many of the statements
are backed up by elaborate statistical assessments
and modeling and over the past decade this work has
taken on an increasingly Bayesian flavor. There have
also been challenges to many of these statements,
despite what the “global warming” proponents de-
scribe as increasingly strong empirical support. See,
for example, the report by Wegman, Scott and Said
(2006) for a statistical critique of some recent mod-
eling efforts.
In Figure 1 we reproduce an example of the tem-
perature reconstruction for the past 2000 years based
on multiple sources prepared by a panel from the
National Research Council (2006); see also National
Academy of Sciences (2008). One thing that is ob-
vious from this figure is the convergence of the data
sources for the past 150 years, from the start of the
industrial revolution, showing temperatures increas-
ing substantially throughout recent times—this is
global warming! What is also clear is the uncer-
tainty associated with these reconstructions going
back further in time—this is indicated by the shad-
ing in the background of the figure, with darkness
associated with greater uncertainty; cf. the article
by Chu (2005).
The precise trajectory of the recent increases in
temperature clearly has substantial uncertainty
across the data sources and models and it would sur-
prise few of us to learn that projections from these
data can vary dramatically. This has recently been
the focus of intensive Bayesian analysis by a number
of authors around the world; see, for example, the
articles by Min and Hense (2006, 2007), and espe-
cially work in the United States by Berliner, Levine
and Shea (2000), Tebaldi et al. (2005) and Sanso,
Forest and Zantedeschi (2008).
Tebaldi, Smith and Sanso´ (2010) described a way
to combine an ensemble of computer simulation mo-
del results and projections and actual observations
via hierarchical modeling in order to derive poste-
rior probabilities of temperature and precipitation
change at regional scale. They considered the ensem-
ble of computer models as being drawn from a su-
perpopulation of such models, and used hierarchical
Bayesian models to combine results and compute
the posterior predictive distribution for a new cli-
mate model’s projections along with the uncertainty
to be associated with them. For a related discussion
about assessing the uncertainties of projections, see
the article by Chandler, Rougier and Collins (2010).
Whether in the context of this work, or in many
other efforts to forecast future temperatures, Baye-
sian and non-Bayesian, almost all modeling efforts
agree that temperatures will continue to rise. Where
the principal disagreements come in is “by how much”
and “what would be the impact by various strategies
for abatement.”
It is worth noting that subjective Bayesian meth-
ods were proposed for use in climate modeling as
early as 1997 by Hobbs and the prominence of Baye-
sian arguments is due not only to statisticians work-
ing in this area but also to climate modeling special-
ists such as Schneider (2002), who has noted:
For three decades, I have been debating
alternative solutions for sustainable devel-
opment with thousands of fellow scientists
and policy analysts—exchanges carried out
in myriad articles and formal meetings.
Despite all that, I readily confess a lin-
gering frustration: uncertainties so infuse
the issue of climate change that it is still
impossible to rule out either mild or catas-
trophic outcomes, let alone provide confi-
dent probabilities for all the claims and
counterclaims made about environmental
problems.
Even the most credible international as-
sessment body, the Intergovernmental Pa-
nel on Climate Change (IPCC), has refu-
sed to attempt subjective probabilistic esti-
mates of future temperatures. This has for-
ced politicians to make their own guesses
about the likelihood of various degrees of
global warming. Will temperatures in 2100
increase by 1.4 degrees Celsius or by 5.8?
The difference means relatively adaptable
changes or very damaging ones. . .
So what then is “the real state of the
world”? Clearly, it isn’t knowable in tradi-
tional statistical terms, even though sub-
jective estimates can be responsibly of-
fered. The ranges presented by the IPCC
in its peer-reviewed reports give the best
snapshot of the real state of climate chan-
ge: we could be lucky and see a mild effect
or unlucky and get the catastrophic out-
comes.
The IPCC assessment builds on formal and infor-
mal use of subjective assessments of the evidence.
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Borehole temperatures (Huang et al., 2000) Glacier lengths (Oerlemans, 2005b)
Multiproxy (Mann and Jones, 2003a) Multiproxy (Moberg et al., 2005a)
Multiproxy (Hegerl et al., 2006) Tree rings (Esper et al., 2002a)
Instrumental record (Jones et al., 2001)
Fig. 1. Smoothed reconstructions of large-scale (Northern Hemisphere mean or global mean) surface temperature variations
from six different research teams are shown along with the instrumental record of global mean surface temperature. Source:
Figure S-1, National Research Council (2006), page 2. Reproduced with permission.
There is in fact now a tradition in this field of ex-
pert elicitation of expert judgments; for example,
see the articles by Morgan and Keith (1995), Keith
(1996) and Zickfeld et al. (2007).
8. DISABILITY AMONG THE ELDERLY
In the United States, there are no official gov-
ernment surveys of disability and how it is chang-
ing over time, but the National Institute on Ag-
ing (NIA) has funded, with support of other gov-
ernment agencies, two major longitudinal surveys
that capture information on disability and link it
to other data—the Health and Retirement Survey
(HRS) and the National Long Term Care Survey
(NLTCS). The original cohort for the NLTCS was
surveyed in 1982 and there have been subsequent wa-
ves in 1984, 1989, 1994, 1999 and 2004. The NLTCS
has been managed by a university-based organiza-
tion since the late 1980s, but actual data collection
has been carried out by the US Census Bureau. Con-
siderable interest in the NLTCS has focused on a se-
ries of measures of disability know as “Activities of
Daily Living” (ADLs) and “Instrumental Activities
of Daily Living” (IADLs), especially for those in the
sample exhibiting some dimension of disability on
a screener question. Erosheva, Fienberg and Joutard
(2007) studied a cross-sectional version of 16 binary
ADLs and IADLs, represented in the form of a 216
contingency table using a Bayesian latent variable
model that was developed to be an analogue to the
frequentist Grade of Membership (GoM) model of
Manton, Woodbury and Tolley (1994), the likeli-
hood function for which is notoriously problematic.
The Bayesian version of the GoM model utilizes
hierarchical modeling ideas through a layered latent
variable structure. Let x= (x1, x2, . . . , xJ) be a vec-
tor of binary manifest variables. The GoM model is
structured around K mixture components (extreme
profiles), and it assigns to each individual a latent
partial membership vector of K nonnegative ran-
dom variables, g = (g1, g2, . . . , gK), whose compo-
nents sum to 1. By assigning a distribution D(g) to
the vector g and integrating, we obtain the marginal
distribution for individual response patterns in the
form of individual-level mixtures. Erosheva, Fien-
berg and Joutard explained how to fit this Bayesian
GoM model using MCMC techniques and apply it
to the data in the 216 contingency table displaying
outcomes on the 16 ADLs and IADLs, treating these
different measures of disability as exchangeable, and
thus as if they were independent and drawn from
another common distribution. Airoldi et al. (2007,
2010) explored related aspects of model specification
and model choice. As with a number of the earlier
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examples, the hierarchical latent structure embed-
ded in this modeling approach is a mechanism for
gaining control over what might otherwise be an un-
manageable number of parameters and essential to
the success of the related methods.
This work on disability opens the door to a num-
ber of challenging problems for the Bayesian mod-
eling community. For example:
• How should a Bayesian working with hierarchical
models such as the Bayesian GoM model incorpo-
rate the survey weights that arise from the sam-
pling scheme of the survey and adjustments for
nonresponse? There is now an extensive literature
that provides conflicting advice on the use of sur-
vey weights in the Bayesian framework, but the
hierarchical model complexities bring these issues
into somewhat sharper focus in this setting; for
example, see the contrasting arguments of Fien-
berg (2009) and Little (2009).
• Manrique-Vallier and Fienberg (2010) extended
these ideas to longitudinal latent profiles applied
to the six ADLs measured across all six waves of
the survey, and Manrique-Vallier (2010) added in
survival and generational effects to address the
question of whether disability is increasing or de-
creasing over time. He appeared to be able to
capture characteristics that others have addressed
using comparisons across cross-sections for each
wave of the survey (see, e.g., Manton and Gu,
2001; Manton, Gu and Lamb, 2006). Scaling these
methods up to the full array of ADLs and IADLs
with key covariates remains a major challenge.
This is a matter of considerable interest to policy
planners who are interested in forecasting future
demands on the health-care infrastructure as a re-
sult of changes in long-term disability over time.
The Bayesian GoM model is a special case of
a much larger class of mixed membership models
that can be used to analyze a diverse array of data
types ranging from text in documents to images, to
linkages in networks, and longitudinal versions may
prove applicable in other settings beyond the study
of disability.
9. CONCLUSION
For much of the twentieth century, approaches to
the design and analysis of statistical studies in gov-
ernment settings and public policy were almost ex-
clusively descriptive or dominated by the frequentist
approach that followed from the work of Fisher and
from Neyman and Pearson. With the neo-Bayesian
revival of the 1950s, Bayesian methods and tech-
niques slowly began to appear in the public arena,
and their use has accelerated dramatically during
the past two decades, especially with the rise of
MCMC methods that have allowed for the sampling
from posterior distributions in settings involving very
large datasets.
In this article, we have attempted to give some
examples, both old and new, of Bayesian methods
in statistical practice in government and public pol-
icy settings and to suggest why in most of the cases
there was ultimately little or no resistance to the
Bayesian approach. Our examples have included cen-
sus-taking and small area estimation, US election
night forecasting, studies reported to the US Food
and Drug Administration, assessing global climate
change and measuring declines in disability among
the elderly. Their diversity suggests that there is
growing recognition of the value of Bayesian results,
and a realization that the approach deals directly
with questions of substantive interest.
Where there has been controversy, it has largely fo-
cused on the role of the choice of prior distributions
and the appropriateness of “borrowing strength”
across geographic boundaries. Arguments in favor of
the use of “objective” priors have done little to stem
the frequentist criticism of Bayesian methods, and
typically ignore the highly subjective aspects of ele-
ments on hierarchical structures and likelihood func-
tions. Through the examples discussed here, we have
tried to convey the fact that a pragmatic Bayesian
approach inevitably includes many subjective ele-
ments, although prior distributions may well draw
on data from related settings and have an empirical
flavor to them. Nonetheless, the principal challenge
to Bayesian methods that remains is the need to
constantly rebut the notion that frequentist meth-
ods are “objective” and thus more appropriate for
use in the public domain.
In other areas of statistical application Bayesian
methodology has also seen a major resurgence and
this is especially true in connection with machine
learning approaches to very large datasets, where
the use of hierarchically structured latent variable
models is essential to generating high-quality esti-
mates and predictions.
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